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Join the struggle against drugs, build a harmonious society!
———Chinese-language banner, Golden Boten City Special Economic
Zone, Laos
We academics have found it difficult to “think ourselves beyond the nation”
(Appadurai 1993: 411). After an early post-Cold War enthusiasm for discover-
ing post-national forms of identity, which were expected to emerge from the
experiences of migrants or diasporas (e.g., Boyarin and Boyarin 1993;
Gilroy 1993; Appadurai 1996; Clifford 1997), we found that neither the
nation, nor the state, nor their combination were losing power or appeal.
Despite a proliferation of writing that explored new forms of sovereignty, in
the end few of them materialized. While it has been easy to identify nationalist
movements decoupled from territorial states, and many states have reclaimed
some form of cultural sovereignty over their diasporas, there is little evidence
of groups attempting to organize themselves into entirely post-national polities.
The theoretical hopes articulated twenty years ago for a post-national world
order have remained decoupled from realities on the ground, and have gradu-
ally faded.
And yet, some anomalous and ambiguous forms of territoriality and sover-
eignty that have actually emerged have largely escaped our notice, until
recently. Particularly since the publication of the English translation of
Giorgio Agamben’s State of Exception (2005), spaces in which normal rules
of the state are suspended have attracted growing attention, notably from
Aihwa Ong (2006), who has a longstanding interest in what she calls forms
of “graduated sovereignty” in Southeast Asia (2000). James Ferguson has
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pointed to the “enclaved mineral-rich patches” in Africa, where “security [is]
provided… by specialized corporations while the… nominal holders of sover-
eignty … certify the industry’s legality … in exchange for a piece of the
action.” He likened this approach to pre-colonial European mercantilist logic,
and contrasted it with the developmental logic of the mature colonial and post-
colonial state (2006: 204). Most scholars have conceived of these spaces of
exception, or of graduated sovereignty—free trade zones, export processing
zones, and the like—as areas carved out of national territories, following the
profit-maximizing logic of neoliberal flexibility, but ultimately under the
control of the nation-state elites, nonetheless.
On the other hand, significant scholarship, most notably in anthropology,
has explored the anomalies of sovereignty in borderlands. This line of thought
goes back to Edmund Leach (1954; 1960), who noted that the highland polities
of Burma had long maintained a zone of ambiguous or multiple allegiances,
never truly incorporated into any of the lowland kingdoms that claimed over-
lordship above them. Many writers have built upon Leach’s approach, most
recently and famously van Schendel (e.g., 2002) and Scott (e.g., 2009), who
argue that some societies of the uplands (and almost always the borderlands)
of Southeast Asia have resisted the nation-state-making projects of lowland
polities.1 But in the literature that analyzes highland/borderland polities from
the perspective of state evasion, these societies appear as valiant atavisms
resisting the logic of nation-state modernity (see Walker 1999).
That scholarship celebrating such “non-state places” risks implying that
they remain outside of modernity is not its only pitfall. Due to the Cold War
heritage of Southeast Asian studies, pockets of resistance against the lowland
states have received more attention and sympathy than has resistance against
postcolonial nation-states in Africa. Western academics have always given
much more explicit support to postcolonial state-building in Africa, and only
recently have scholars like Frederick Cooper taken a more critical look at the
creation of individual African nation-states and started to take more seriously
the alternatives that may have been available, including plans for a French-
speaking commonwealth (see Cooper 2011). Despite all the criticisms of
both the idea and the practice of national sovereignty, the twentieth-century
maxim that it is a necessary condition of modernization has yet to be seriously
questioned.
Conversely, certain forms of ambiguous sovereignty imposed by the intru-
sive logic of modernization, such as enclaves run by Western mining compa-
nies in poor countries, have largely escaped ethnographic scrutiny despite
1 Much of the historical scholarship on the “fuzziness” of premodern sovereignty is based on
Southeast Asia and China, for example Tambiah (1977), Keyes (1979), Thongchai (1994), Hevia
(1995), and Smith (1998). Leach’s original argument has recently been revisited in a volume
edited by Sadan and Robinne (2007).
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frequent reference to them as testimony to persistent imperialism. On the
whole, such polities have been seen as marginal or epiphenomenal to the
grand scheme of neoliberal globalization—as its freakish outcomes or its left-
behind discontents—or else as internal to the scheme’s manipulation by nation-
state elites (e.g., Ferguson 2006). These situations are a far cry from the liber-
ation that early-1990s theorists hoped post-national sovereignty would bring
about, and from forms of sovereignty akin to the protectorate or the United
Nations mandate territory, which some political scientists have suggested rein-
troducing based on the experiences of “failed states” and the military occu-
pations of Afghanistan and Iraq (e.g., Krasner 2004).
Against this background, the present article calls attention to a situation
in the China-Laos borderlands in which something like post-national sover-
eignty is actually practiced; not in the sense that the two nation-states do
not matter, but rather in that, while both possess aspects of sovereign
control over the territories and people in question, much of the sovereignty
is vested in a private corporation. This corporation, in turn, borrows the
administrative and symbolic trappings of one and sometimes both states to
bolster its own legitimacy. Despite their geographic marginality, the
“special zones” of the Lao borderlands position themselves as the new
engines of dynamism that will bring the backward lowland states into the
whirlwind of modernity, and in fact they have achieved some success.
They cast themselves as doubly modern by simultaneously deploying the
regalia of the Chinese state, which stand in the region for the strong, success-
ful, modernizing state, and a pioneer discourse of economic and social
freedom from the strictures of that very state, also in the name of modernity.
What this discursive strategy both expresses and grants legitimacy to is the
meshing of state and non-state fantasies of development.
Although the region described here is peripheral to major economic and
population centers, the developments unfolding there are part of a massive
global expansion of capital and population from China, reaching from
Eastern Europe into the Pacific. Much Western commentary treats it as state-
directed imperialism or neocolonialism. I will argue here that investigation of
the role of private concessionaries in generating anomalous forms of sover-
eignty—to which, today as before, there is much more than simply the inexor-
able expansion of (neo)liberal logic—reveals a more productive parallel with
Western imperialist dominions. The current debate over whether or not
China is becoming a neocolonial power is largely determined by political sym-
pathies and ideological dichotomies, and serves little analytical purpose. Yet
the manner, scale, and discursive justification with which various Chinese
state and private parties engage with low-income countries warrants a fresh
look at the relationship between national sovereignty and modernization, and
this relationship begs comparison with both colonial and immediate postcolo-
nial configurations.
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T H E R I S E A N D FA L L O F T H E G O L D E N B O T E N C I T Y S P E C I A L
E C O N OM I C Z O N E
2
Golden Boten City (GBC) was opened in 2007 as a land concession across the
Chinese border in northern Laos. Fokhing, a Hong Kong-registered company,
has leased the 16 square kilometer area for thirty years, with the option of
renewing the lease twice. Its central feature is a hotel-casino complex. In the
beginning, virtually everything and everyone in the place were Chinese,
from the employees and small business owners (estimated by GBC’s managers
at 3,000 in 2008 and 4,800 in the peak season of 2010)3 to the currency (only
yuan were accepted), and the beer. Until December 2010, both the fixed and
mobile phone networks and the Internet also came from China, and the zone
even runs on Peking time, one hour ahead of Laos. Members of a seven
hundred-strong security force manned a booth at each entry to the zone and
marched around in military formations in uniforms resembling those of
Chinese police, emblazoned with “Special Zone Security” in Chinese charac-
ters. Lao casino staff say that, in the past, Chinese citizens accused of the
crimes and also bodies of Chinese murder victims were whisked quietly
back over the border.
According to a report written at the end of 2010, the zone by then had three
hundred Lao employees, but they were visible only in low-skilled jobs such as
maids or bellboys. The zone’s general manager claimed that some one thousand
Lao worked there, including those running small businesses along its edges.
There are also some Burmese employees. Wages are higher in the zone than
in either Laos or China’s surrounding provinces: in 2011, cleaning jobs were
being advertised that paid 1,800 yuan (US$300) a month plus room and board.4
From the outset, the company’s management has styled GBC as a tequ, or
special zone, but the Lao government did not officially gazette it until the turn
of the last decade.5 Under the statutes, the zone is governed by an Economic
Committee and an Administrative Committee. Members of the former are
appointed by the investors, most notably by GBC Chairman Huang Mingxuan,
a Hong Kong resident originally from southern Fujian Province who formerly
operated a gambling hall in Mong La just across the China-Burma border. As
head of the Economic Committee he has delegated management positions to
several relatives from his home village. The Committee’s office is a four-story
2 Except where indicated, this and the following section are based on three periods of ethno-
graphic fieldwork between 2008 and 2011, one of which included a visit to northern Burma.
The first of these was carried out jointly with Chris Lyttleton (see Lyttleton and Nyíri 2011).
3 These included shopkeepers from Yunnan across the border, prostitutes from Sichuan and Hei-
longjiang in the northeast, and snack stall keepers from Fujian, Hunan, and Zhejiang in the south-
east of the country.
4 All dollar amounts given are in U.S. dollars.
5 Zone administrations refer to late 2009 or early 2010 as the date GBC and the Golden Triangle
Special Economic Zones were established (Vientiane Times 2009; Hanzi 2010).
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building across the road from GBC. In the meeting room hang photos of GBC
leaders with Lao government officials, including the powerful former presi-
dent, Khamtay Siphandone. The nineteen members of the Administrative Com-
mittee are appointed by the Lao prime minister’s office but, for now, the
investing company pays them. A yearly, increasing concession fee has been
fixed in advance: $700,000 until 2010, $2 million in 2011–2013, and $2.4
million in 2014–2015 (Pinkaew 2011). In return for this fee, the Economic
Committee has the right to levy its own taxes and administrative fees, and
the intention is to use these to pay the members of the Administrative Commit-
tee. The taxes are retained by the zone’s administration, except for a small
amount which, the general manager told me, is used for “aid given to neighbor-
ing towns.” The administration can also enact legislation, and issues license
plates and ID cards that are different from those in the rest of Laos but valid
across the country.6
GBC’s general manager stressed that the territory is Lao, but
Chinese-English bilingual street names, the second-hand Chinese police van,
the uniforms, the currency, banners with slogans about harmonious society,
and the television channels all reproduce what Benedict Anderson called the
“regalia” (1993: 183) of the Chinese state, even though the zone’s managers
may well see them as, above all, paraphernalia of modernity. When I asked
the zone’s office manager, an ethnic Tai woman from Sipsongpanna across
the border in China, why they fly banners with slogans promoted by the
Chinese government, she replied, “Those things that Laos does not have, we
need to borrow.” The check-in procedure at the hotel follows Chinese rules,
which means that everyone, including Lao citizens, must show their passports,
which are dutifully copied by the Chinese reception staff.
In 2010, a unit of Lao police was added to the Chinese security force to
form a new public safety department under the zone’s Administrative Commit-
tee. More significantly, the Lao border post, which was initially sited beyond
the special zone border so that Chinese visitors did not have to deal with
Lao immigration, has been moved and casino visitors must now pass
through it. The new post, like the old one, is little more than a single-story
shed, and contrasts sharply with the spanking new Chinese border station.
Despite the clear subordination and near-invisibility of Lao workers, there
are indications that relations between Chinese and Lao are negotiated in
complex ways. During my visit to GBC in August 2010, I overheard a
phone call the general manager’s assistant made regarding a Lao casino
dealer who had been hit and killed by a car while riding her motorcycle.
Although the driver was unknown, the company had paid the family 40,000
yuan, or about $8,000.
6 These rights are affirmed in Articles 62, 63, and 94 of the vaguely phrased prime minister’s
Decree 443/PM, which was, however, issued after the zone began issuing license plates.
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According to the managing director of the zone, the Administrative Com-
mittee said that $130 million had been invested in the zone as of mid-2010.
Three large hotels and a nightclub called “Quanqiucun” (global village) have
been built, along with some fifty four- and five-story buildings that house
workers’ dormitories, shops, and apartments for sale. According to a report
written for a November 2010 visit of the chairman of the Lao National Assem-
bly, the zone administration had also constructed two new customs buildings
and a primary school, and had prepared 10 hectares of ground for the houses
of relocated villagers and a relocated salt factory. Whereas in 2008 the zone
was dark at night, by 2010 it was illuminated by the shimmering neon signs
of the night entertainment venues. Accommodation capacity has grown to
twenty-seven hundred rooms, and the general manager told me investment
had come from Thailand, Singapore, Russia, Ukraine, and the United
Kingdom, although by early 2011 some of these investors were withdrawing
and as many as a thousand small merchants had left.
In early 2010, a series of reports in Chinese media alleged that security
staff at Boten falsely detained and tortured Chinese gamblers who were
unable to pay their debts, in order to force their families to pay. The Foreign
Ministry issued a statement warning Chinese nationals against going to Laos
to gamble due to the risk of scams and kidnappings (MqVU 2010). In the
spring of that year, Chinese border guards began turning back Chinese citizens
who had not obtained visas in advance, even though Lao regulations allow
them to obtain them at the Lao border. Border passes, valid only for a
limited area of Laos, became harder to get. These measures were clearly
intended to disrupt the business of recruiters who had been arranging gamblers’
travel packages. Then, in December 2010, Yunnan Province’s police depart-
ment ordered the three Chinese telephone companies operating in Boten to
cut their services. GBC switched to more expensive Lao providers, but by
the following January the combination of these two sanctions had reduced
the inflow of gamblers to a trickle, and five of the twelve companies operating
gambling halls had pulled out. Meanwhile, the prefectural police department of
Sipsongpanna demanded that GBC hand over some fifty gambling hall oper-
ators and employees wanted on charges of inducement to gamble and facilitat-
ing illegal border crossing. In April 2011, the last and largest gambling hall
closed after its owner, a Philippine citizen, was arrested in Shanghai on unre-
lated charges, and by May the largest hotel was closed. The zone’s population
now numbered one-tenth of what it had been in its heyday.
Under pressure from China, the zone’s management now appealed to the
Lao government for support to, in the words of the office manager, “liaise with
China on opening up border tourism and resolving the issues of visa on arrival
and border passes.” The manager explained to me that they planned to “enthu-
siastically support the Lao government” in financing the Lao section of a new
Yunnan-Singapore railway, for which the government is seeking investors. The
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rights of special zones had been formalized in a vaguely phrased government
decree in October 2010, at a time of increasing Chinese pressure and
growing unease in Laos following negative online coverage (state media did
not report on the alleged kidnappings and torture). This decree could be read
either as an effort to place limits on the sovereignty of the zones or, conversely,
as a move to cement their legitimacy. Its text suggests the latter: it makes no
provisions for protecting the rights of residents or employees or for settling dis-
putes, while it charges the Economic Committee rather than the Administrative
Committee with ensuring “cultural, social, education and public health devel-
opment” as well as with “security and order,” and with allocating land (Decree
no. 443/PM, Article 94). It also asks the district within which the zone is
located and surrounding village administrations to provide vocational training
for residents, protect Special Economic Zone facilities, and foster the growth of
local business (Articles 87–88).
Despite the demise of the company, the special zone lives on, and a
company based in Yunnan Province acquired GBC from its original owners.
Golden Boten, deserted though it is, remains a monument to the Chinese
version of urban modernity matched by no other place in Laos. At the same
time, the moving of the immigration post, the dispute over the security force
and the conflict over the handling of suspects in the criminal case that led to
the company’s downfall, and the new decree all suggest that its sovereignty
remains contested. The Hong Kong registration of the original investment
company and the Taiwanese nationality of the former general manager also
confound any conclusion that this zone is simply an extension of the
People’s Republic of China; instead, they deliberately, intentionally suggest a
promise of deterritorialized Chinese modernity (Ong 1999).
M A C H I N E G U N S , G O L D E N C H O P S T I C K S , A N D O R G AN I C A G R I C U LT U R E
I N T H E G O L D E N T R I A N G L E S P E C I A L E C O N OM I C Z O N E
The Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone in Bokeo Province, across the
Mekong from Thailand, was gazetted in February 2010. The Lao government
had granted the Hong Kong-registered KingsRomans Group a concession to
the area in 2007.7 In 2010, a zone manager told me that the first year’s conces-
sion fee was around $850,000, but a driver said that one-time personal pay-
ments of $5 million were made to both the prime minister and the president.
News reports, citing the Lao government as a source, identified the area of
the concession as 827 hectares and reported the duration of the concession was
seventy-five years (Voice of America Lao Service 2010), but recent company
documents say the concession is for 103 square kilometers—ten times larger
—and ninety-nine years (Hanzi 2010: 13; KingsRomans 2010). Like his
7 At: www.kingsromans.com (accessed 25 July 2010).
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counterpart in Boten, the chairman of KingsRomans and of the zone’s manage-
ment committee, Zhao Wei, once operated a gambling hall in Mong La, a three-
hour speedboat ride up the Mekong. Zhao was born in northeast China and is a
Macau resident; his Macau company, the Yinhe Group, is an investor in the two
casinos that have operated in the zone since 2009. These casinos are larger in
scale than in those in Boten, and the newest one was designed by a Portuguese
architect who has also designedMacau casinos. In late 2010, Zhao said KingsRo-
mans had invested more than $500 million and had fifteen hundred employees
(Hanzi 2010: 13–15), although as of mid-2009 only $26 million of that had
been registered by the Planning and Investment Department of Bokeo Province
(Tan 2010: 23, n. 41). In 2010, employees estimated the zone’s population at
about two thousand, but a year later estimates varied between six and ten thou-
sand, excluding some five thousand Lao peasants who inhabit seven villages in
the zone. According to a KingsRomans public relations officer—a man from
northern China in his late twenties who had moved to the zone from Dubai
where, he told me, he had worked as an interpreter—about one thousand of
these people work for the company or sell produce to it.
The zone is near the Thai end of Route 3, the new road that links Thailand
to China and whose other end is at Boten. But unlike Boten, this zone is not
along the road but on farmland 50 kilometers north of it. Much of the
FIGURE 1 Golden Boten City, January 2011. Author’s photo.
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investment has been in basic infrastructure: reinforcing the riverbank and build-
ing roads, a water-bottling plant, and the houses for 114 farming households to
be resettled within the zone. The company has planted over 1,000 mu (about 67
hectares) of maize, wet rice, vegetables, various types of commercial forest, a
fruit orchard, and flowers, and raises some four hundred pigs, five hundred
head of cattle, and poultry. Plans for the future include developing “organic
sightseeing farming” with the help of specialists from China (Hanzi 2010:
15). Some produce is already being sold outside the zone, and this is said to
be undercutting Lao market prices.8
A well-known Chinese planning firm executed the master plan for the
zone, of which a scale model is on display in a special building. The same
firm was responsible for Overseas Chinese City in Shenzhen, a hallmark of
special zone urban modernity in early 1990s China. The plan includes
several hotels, an island resort, a golf course, a hospital, and a school. Com-
pleted so far are two casinos, five hotels, a nightclub, a shopping arcade, a
covered market, a larger shopping center, a farmer’s market, and a large
number of dormitories and single-story houses for families. Two-thirds of the
area consists of hills that will be left undeveloped as a nature reserve; the
swidden agriculture traditionally practiced by the area’s mountain dwellers
will be forbidden there. While many Chinese invest in rubber plantations in
northern Laos, Zhao Wei has prohibited rubber planting in the zone since he
plans to develop it as a base for regional tourism.
These tourism plans appear to rely on the Golden Triangle’s aura of crime,
mystery, and opulence. The promotional brochure features photos of guests
reclining on leopard skins and eating from golden bowls with golden chop-
sticks, firing M-16 assault rifles and Uzi submachine guns at the shooting
range, and riding elephants and petting giant snakes. They also show a Thai
kickboxing contest and a racetrack. The Kapok Festival in February, which
marks the flowering of the trees, is a cross between an official holiday and a
signature tourist event. In 2011, it included a meeting of regional tour operators,
a music and dance show with performers from China, Burma, Thailand, and
Laos, an international crafts fair, and a beauty contest. In addition to tourism,
long-term plans include developing a “logistics, finance, communications,
and media” hub. All of these investments are described in terms of opium
substitution.9
Thai and Chinese companies offer telephone network coverage. Electri-
city comes from Thailand, but the sockets are Chinese. Like Boten, the zone
is on Peking time. The statutes governing the zone’s legal status seem to be
the same as those for Boten, but Golden Triangle’s managers have made
more of the zone’s autonomy, which covers “everything except defense,
8 Deng Rui, personal communication, 2010.
9 At: http://www.laosez.com/html/tqgk/ (accessed 16 Feb. 2011).
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foreign relations, and legislation” (Hanzi 2010: 13). Zhao Wei, known as
“Chairman Zhao,” makes public appearances akin to those made by Chinese
officials, and zone managers are referred to as “cadres.” Here, too, one sees
anti-drug posters and banners, and two “notices” (tonggao) issued by the
Administrative Committee and signed by Zhao Wei are pasted to the walls:
one “Strictly Forbidding the Consumption and Trafficking in Drugs,” and
another “Strictly Forbidding the Illegal Possession of Firearms and Explo-
sives.” Like all official communication, they are written in the prose of
Chinese government documents. They warn that violators will be fined
50,000 yuan by the Safety Office and dealt with according to Lao law.
The Safety Office comprises about one hundred Lao policemen and, under
separate command, a detachment of Chinese and Burmese security guards. Lao
police can be seen patrolling the rural parts of the zone in brand-new cars—pre-
sumably bought by the zone administration—but not around the casinos,
suggesting an informal division of jurisdiction but also serving as a reminder
that here, too, the limits of extraterritoriality are open to contestation.
According to one news report, one of Zhao’s assistants is a former rural
government official from China, while another previously served as a diplomat
at the Chinese embassy in Vientiane (Fawthrop 2011). On the Lao side, the
FIGURE 2 The Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone seen from Chiang Saen, January 2011.
Author’s photo.
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chairman of the Administrative Committee is a Lao police official with a degree
from Vietnam, while the vice-chairman is a member of the Lao National
Assembly. Street signs, like official documents, are trilingual (Lao, English,
and Chinese), but West Garden Road, the main riverside avenue, is lined
with weather-beaten Lao national and Party flags, perhaps left over from a
high-ranking official’s visit. A brochure promoting the zone features photos
of Zhao Wei with Party General Secretary Choummaly Sayasone, Premier
Thongsing Thammavong, and other dignitaries.10
Unlike the much smaller Boten, the Golden Triangle zone lacks a direct
boundary with China, which makes direct Chinese intervention there imposs-
ible. Many guests arrive via Thailand. KingsRomans charters flights from
Macau and Bangkok to Chiang Rai, about an hour’s drive across the Thai
border. A helicopter ferries VIPs from Chiang Rai airport, the Chinese
border, and Vientiane, while less important guests make do with a fleet of
Cadillac stretch limos—during one of my visits a group of Yunnan Province
officials arrived in them to “inspect” the Kunming-Bangkok highway.
Like the clientele, the zone’s workforce is more multinational than
Boten’s. While petty traders and prostitutes tend to be Chinese, construction
workers are mostly Burmese, and even some Lao farms within the zone report-
edly employ Burmese farmhands. Company, casino, and hotel staff are a mix of
Chinese, Thai, and Burmese, and the zone’s Lao farming population may
become more visible with the construction of farmer’s markets. Many of the
early employees moved to the zone with the investors from Mong La and
were later joined by friends and relatives. A wave of shop and stall keepers,
prostitutes, and other petty entrepreneurs also arrived from Sichuan, Fujian,
Hunan, and northeastern China, and a handful came from Burma and Thailand.
Investors often recruit workers in their own hometowns, setting off new
migration chains.
Although most migrants come from rural areas, the zone also attracts all
sorts of fortune-seekers. For example, one Thai man from Chiang Saen on
the Thai side of the Mekong arrived after earning a university degree in
Bangkok and studying English in Oxford. He came to help his sister, a share-
holder in a gambling hall, run her jewelry shop. A noodle vendor arrived from
Ayuttaya, near Bangkok. A Shan man from Burma who helps his brother run a
food stall and speaks excellent Mandarin arrived following stints of work in
Malaysia and Thailand. In the zone he met his wife, an ethnic Hani woman
from China employed by a shop that sells credit for Chinese mobile phones.
Those other than common laborers all speak some Chinese, and the higher
their position the more important this is. As a Lao woman explained to me,
10 Apart from frequent official visits, the zone also plays host to families of officials on their way
to or from Thailand: just before one of my visits, they had entertained Choummaly’s two
grandchildren.
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it is easy to find a job with good wages, but you can only keep it if you learn
some Chinese. Ethnic Chinese from northern Thailand and Burma often work
in positions of some trust, for example as drivers or bodyguards. Wages are
similar to those in Boten, but here there is an ethnic hierarchy: Burmese con-
struction workers’ monthly wages start at from $120 to $150, and those of
KingsRomans’ Lao employees at $150 to $200, while Chinese workers
receive a 400 yuan supplement for “working abroad.”
A G E N E A L O G Y O F S P E C I A L Z O N E S
Over the last five years, China has been the leading source of investment in
Laos, and Chinese companies are far and away the most important builders
of roads, bridges, dams, and most recently railways, largely using concessional
loans backed by the Chinese state (International Rivers 2008; Lyttleton and
Nyíri 2011). China has earmarked $771 million for twenty-one infrastructure
projects to be carried out from 2011–2015 (Khaosan Pathet Lao 2010). In
northern Laos, the most significant driver of recent economic and social
change has been Chinese investments in contract farming (mostly rubber and
cassava), mining, and retail trade, all facilitated by Chinese-built roads (Shi
2008). These investments have brought with them a large number of Chinese
migrants, ranging from construction and mine workers to small traders, who
now dominate the markets for consumer goods and, increasingly, sell agricul-
tural produce.
In the borderlands, working for a Chinese business has become the most
accessible option for upward mobility, and more and more non-Chinese chil-
dren are attending a growing number of Chinese schools. In the Northern
Lao town of Luang Namtha, for example, enrolment in the Chinese school
rose from around 30 in 2008, to 475 in 2011. Members of some ethnic
groups in the north of Burma, Laos, and Thailand are once again emphasizing
their historical connections to China, this time because of its connotations of
economic progress (Toyota 2002; Diana 2009; Le Bail and Tournier 2010).11
The mountainous borderlands of northern Laos are part of the region that
James Scott (borrowing van Schendel’s term) called “Zomia.” Leach and many
subsequent scholars have based their arguments about “fuzzy sovereignty” on
this area’s history. Throughout most of the twentieth century this particular
corner of “Zomia” hosted numerous insurgencies, drug-fuelled and otherwise,
11 Many travelers and scholars (Walker 1892; Scott 1932; Leach 1960; Prescott 1977; Forbes
and Henley 1997; Hill 1998; Davis 2003; Edwards 2005) have noted that the highland polities
of Burma, and the neighboring areas of contemporary Thailand and Laos, have a long history
not only of imperial Chinese influence that ranges from material culture to political organization,
but also of small-scale Chinese immigration of traders and farmers from Yunnan Province. One
high-ranking British colonial official even suggested that parts of the borderlands be made into a
Sino-British condominium (Edwards 2005: 220). The final demarcation of the border did not
take place until 1941.
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and there remain pockets of armed resistance. The end of the Cold War,
however, brought fundamental changes. As borders opened, regional
cooperation increased, cash flowed in, and arms supplies dried up, insurgents
began to engage with lowland states in new ways.
HuangMingxuan and ZhaoWei both made some of their money in Burma’s
Shan State Special Zone 4, controlled by a remnant of the Burmese Communist
Party insurgency that dates back to the 1950s. The special zones that Huang and
Zhao now run, from the administrative structure down to the street signs, are
clearly inspired by Special Zone 4. Yet Huang and Zhao’s move from Burma
to Laos reflects a broader shift in the interaction between states, private capital,
and ideologies of governance in the region. Formerly Zomian enclaves and
their ruling elites—in many cases former insurgents who have turned to
business—have benefited from the high international profile of “special econ-
omic zones” as a (“Chinese”) model of economic development (Brautigam
and Tang Xiaoyang 2011), and from the growing popularity of concessionary
land leases among governments of poor countries (Bayart et al. 2004; Cotula
et al. 2009). They want to hedge against encroachment by lowland states, and
are joining legitimate international circuits and linking up with global and
regional economic opportunities, particularly the infrastructural initiative
known as the Greater Mekong Subregion (Lyttleton et al. 2004; Edwards
2005; Glassman 2010). Seeking respectability, they have embraced the develop-
mentalist discourse of “transport corridors” that the Asian Development Bank
and China have promoted in the region, and they are benefiting more broadly
from the growing clout of China in regards the region’s development hopes.
Although Zhao and Wei were late arrivals in Special Zone 4 and never
became part of its leadership, the genealogy of the enclaved government
they now champion reaches back to the early 1950s, when the small ethnic
Chinese population of northern Thailand, Burma, and Laos—known locally
as Haw—expanded due to an influx of defeated soldiers, stragglers,
“bandits,” and refugees after the Communist victory in China. They and
their descendants formed distinct villages, intermarried with non-Chinese,
and generally fit into the pattern of “hill tribes.” Yet they attained greater pros-
perity and soon became models for agricultural innovation for the surrounding
areas on account of their “obviously superior way of life” (Mote 1967: 518). In
the early years, Kuomintang generals acted as the de facto rulers of Yunnanese
Chinese and their family members, about ninety thousand people in all (Chang
2001). They appointed village headmen, maintained armies, and served as
patrons of the opium, arms, and gems trades across the Burma-Thailand
border. Khun Sa, a Chinese-Shan warlord whose Shan United Army went on
to control much of that border between 1985 and 1996, trained with Kuomin-
tang troops in the 1950s and 1960s (McCoy 1999).
From 1968 until 1982, China provided military support, instructors, and
volunteers for the Burmese People’s Army (BPA) of the Communist Party of
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Burma (CPB), which was instrumental in routing the Kuomintang from Burma
to Thailand. In its heyday, the BPA controlled an area of over 20,000 square
kilometers along the Yunnan border and commanded more than twenty thou-
sand mostly local “hill tribe” troops. Some of the BPA commanders were
ethnic Chinese from lowland Burmese cities (Guo 2007: 42). At the turn of
the 1970s, the BPA’s ranks were joined by thousands of “educated youths”
(zhiqing): urban youths who had been sent down to the Yunnan countryside
after Mao Zedong decided to curb the spontaneous violence of the first three
years of the Cultural Revolution (51nb.com 2009). Some of these youths,
driven by the ideals of heroism they had been taught, but often deemed
unworthy for their “bad” class backgrounds, sought to prove themselves in
the Burmese revolution. Others wanted to escape the hardships of their forcible
rustication, while still others were fleeing persecution or poverty (Guo 2007:
40). They were joined by older Han Chinese who settled in the border
region under the zhibian (“helping socialist construction in the borderlands”)
campaign of the 1950s and 1960s. According to one former fighter’s estimate,
some thirty thousand volunteers from China joined the BPA between 1968 and
1978 (Wang 2011: 9). Most fought in the base areas across from the Chinese
border, which developed their own civil administrations, tax system, police,
prisons, schools, and hospitals, issued their own license plates, and, with
Chinese help, built hydropower stations (Lintner 1999: 282).
This flight to Burma was unparalleled in that it offered a way to get out of
Mao’s China without being branded a traitor and also because its participants’
motivations displayed a complex mix of resentment against and support for the
regime and its ideology. Volunteers from China were far better educated than
were local “tribal” soldiers, and they were often given the hardest tasks.
They had a very high casualty rate, but those who survived often rose in the
ranks. In 1972, when China-Burma relations thawed and some fighting units
of the People’s Liberation Army were withdrawn, the BPA’s military fortunes
began to decline and its commanders turned to cultivating and taxing opium.
Many volunteers who saw a future for themselves in China returned there
(this required permission from the Yunnan Province Foreign Affairs Office),
while others defected to Khun Sa’s army. In 1975, all “urban youth” were
recalled to China, and many were permitted to return to the cities, but many
others stayed on in Burma. More returned in the early 1980s when Deng Xiaop-
ing’s reforms started.12
12 Several memoirs have been published by former volunteers (e.g., Wang 2010; 2011) or are
available online (e.g., 51nb.com 2009). To mention just one typical life history: Kang Guohua,
who was forbidden to join the Red Guards because his father had been classified a capitalist,
wanted to wipe away the family’s shame by volunteering to fight for Burma’s “liberation,” and
went to Burma in 1969 at the age of nineteen. A friend of Kang’s fled to Burma after his brother
committed suicide after being attacked by Red Guards. The volunteers recall being so strongly
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After Mao’s death, China’s assistance to the CPB was drastically reduced,
and in 1989 it stopped altogether. (A year earlier Thailand had withdrawn
support from the Kuomintang.) During this period, opium production and
taxes on the Burma-China trade became the party’s main source of income
(ibid.: 358–61). “Paradoxically,” but more in line with the direction China
itself was then taking, “the area controlled by … the CPB became a haven
for free trade in then-socialist Burma” (ibid.: 361).
In 1989, BPA troops—principally ethnic Wa but led partly by Chinese
officers—rebelled, ousted the CPB’s Burman leadership, and gave up their
revolutionary ideology. Through Chinese mediation they reached a ceasefire
agreement with the Burmese junta in return for a free hand in running their ter-
ritory, which was split into four “special regions” within Burma’s Shan State.
Three of these, Number 1 (Kokang), Number 4 (Mong La), and Number 2,
with a combined area of about 50,000 square kilometers, were run by
Chinese leaders. These were, respectively, the Myanmar National Democratic
Alliance Army under Chairman Peng Jiasheng (Phueng Kya-Shin), the
National Democratic Alliance Army-Eastern Shan State under Chairman Sai
Lin, and the United Wa State Army (UWSA) under Chairman Bao Youxiang
(International Crisis Group [henceforth ICG] 2009: 10–12; Haitang Shequ
n.d.). According to Chinese accounts, Bao Youxiang hailed from Sichuan
and had been sent down to Yunnan for rustication in 1971 (51nb.com
2009).13 Sai Lin, too, has been an “educated youth” in Yunnan, but he is
mixed Shan-Chinese and born in Burma (Lintner 1999: 507). Peng Jiasheng
is an ethnic Chinese from Kokang who had his own local army before
joining the BPA and rising to become its vice-commander. Later he was one
of the central figures in the 1989 mutiny. During the BPA insurgency, two of
the six battalions Peng Jiasheng commanded were staffed by “educated
youths” from China (Guo 2007: 44–46). Twelve of the top UWSA commanders
are said to be ethnically Chinese (ICG 2010: 4). On account of their relatively
high education and political connections, former “educated youth” occupy
important administrative positions in all three special regions, as do BPA
cadres trained in China and their sons, some of whom were born in China.
The special regions alleviated China’s concerns with the insurgencies
along the border. They allowed the Burmese junta to pacify the borders after
decades of civil war and open them to trade at a time when it was taking its
first steps away from a planned economy. They also let local armies keep
their arms and some territory and revenue. The regions also appeared to fit
the pattern of “special economic zones” that China had introduced a decade
influenced by Chinese films about anti-imperialist heroes that they actually fought with one breast
bared for the enemy bullet (51nb.com 2009).
13 Bertil Lintner, however, describes Bao as a Wa from Burma (1999: 514).
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earlier, or, even more closely, the “special administrative region” (SAR) model
that had been agreed on for Hong Kong and Macau under the “one country, two
systems” concept. Although the ceasefire agreements were meant to be tempor-
ary, the term “special zone” holds continuing fascination for both ethnic insur-
gencies and the Burmese junta. They presumably hold differing interpretations
of it, but its very ambiguity may add to its attractiveness. Thus, the Kachin
Independence Organisation, which set up its own special region in Kachin
State under a separate ceasefire agreement, proposed to China that the ethnic
groups within Burma be granted autonomy along the lines of Hong Kong’s
and Macau’s status (ibid.: 6).14 In 2011, with Chinese encouragement, the
junta enacted a new law on special economic zones, and that same year the gov-
ernment signed a contract with a Thai company to develop a 250-square kilo-
meter special economic zone around the southern town of Dawei, complete
with a deep sea port and a railway to Thailand (Szep 2012).
The ceasefires, which ended thirty years of warfare, led to an expansion in
the production of opium and heroin, and later, after the implementation of opium
bans, of methamphetamine (Parker 2006). The latter had been started some years
earlier and had made former CPB commanders, now heading splinter groups,
“some of the richest men in Burma” (Lintner 2002: 114). A Sino-Burmese
border trade agreement signed in 1988 enabled legal trade with China as well.
Much of this trade was run by former “sent-down youth” who had returned to
China but retained close contacts with special zone leaderships.15
The three regions established civilian administrative divisions reminiscent
of China’s: prefectures (zhou), counties (xian), townships (xiang), and districts
(qu) (51nb.com 2009). Political structures were set up with names identical to
those in China, such as People’s Political Consultative Conferences, and flags
and coats of arms modeled on China’s were adopted. The regions continued to
rely on trade with China for all industrial goods and many food products. Since
at least 1992, low-level official contacts have been maintained between the
special regions and county-level Chinese authorities (though these have met
with disapproval from Peking [ICG 2010: 13] and are controversial within
the Yunnan provincial government). For instance, when a representative of
the Yunnan Province Foreign Affairs office attended the UWSA’s celebration
of the twentieth anniversary of the coup against the CPB, Bao Youxiang
“expressed gratitude for China’s twenty years of support” (ICG 2009: 10, n.
103, 104), and asked for more investment, infrastructure construction, aid,
“human resources training,” and an expansion of the opium-replacement
schemes. Chinese agricultural investors in the regions had benefited from
14 For a list of special regions, see Irrawaddy (2004). Thanks to Semuren for pointing this source
out to me.
15 My own 2011 fieldwork in Special Region 4 was arranged through one of these
cadres-turned-businessmen.
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these Chinese government subsidies since the ban on opium cultivation (ibid.:
12, n. 122; Guo 2007: 63–64). Some members of the special regions’ police
forces have received training at Yunnan military academies (51nb.com 2009;
Wang 2011). In the late 1970s and 1980s, when the Chinese government
trained Hmong guerrillas to fight the Vietnam-backed Lao government, the
rebels transited through Special Zone Region 4 and, according to Lintner
(1999: 402), Sai Lin later tried to use connections he had gained thereby to
establish a drug route via Laos.
In the 1990s and 2000s, the special regions benefited from a renewed
influx of migration and investment from China. “Educated youth” and other
earlier settlers began inviting their relatives and friends to come and benefit
from the growing economy. Other migrants are small traders, many of them
from Hunan, with no previous connection to the region. While the use of the
Chinese language had always been common in the area, the special regions
adopted it as the language of education, and for their official communications,
which employ a style identical to that used by authorities in China. They also
adopted the Chinese currency and connected to China’s mobile telephone
network and power grid. Bertil Lintner (2002) states that the special regions,
particularly Number 4, also profited as conduits for much illegal emigration
from China in the 1990s.16
Chinese companies, taking advantage of the opium-substitution subsidies,
moved in to plant rubber, sugarcane, tea, and other cash crops (Zhang Ansheng
and Zhang Xiaoming 2002; Woods 2011). In 1992, Menghai County, con-
cerned with the influx of drugs from Special Region 4, experimentally
planted 10 mu (0.3 hectares) of wet rice under the supervision of technicians
and a manager from the county’s seed company. By 1995, this had expanded
to 10,000 mu (660 hectares). By then, Special Region 4 had achieved self-
sufficiency in rice and was able to export some to Special Region 2 and to
Menghai (Shi 1998). Other counties bordering on the special regions began
to follow suit, and in 1996 Zhenkang County signed an agreement with
Kokang to develop 30,000 mu (2,000 hectares) of farmland jointly under an
opium-replacement contract-farming scheme (Zhao 2011). This incentive
accompanied Chinese government pressure on the special regions to ban
opium cultivation, which Sai Lin did in 1997. For many years the local govern-
ments granted the subsidies, but in 2006 Peking allocated 800 million yuan to
fund opium-substitution schemes in Burma and Laos. For part of the population
the scheme resulted in a significant rise of incomes; some larger planting house-
holds earned 40,000 yuan ($6,200) annually and even bought cars (Zhao 2011).
Mong La, however, became known for gambling and prostitution; according to
16 Lintner (2002) claims that migrants aboard the Golden Venture, which ran aground outside
New York Harbor in 1993 and attracted global attention to the phenomenon, had all come via
Special Region 4.
E N C L AV E S O F I M P R O V E M E N T 549
one report, it attracted three thousand visitors from across the border each day,
including many officials. As early as 1993, Special Region Number 4 and
Menghai County signed an agreement that allowed day tours, but after the auth-
orization of casinos in 1998, Special Region 4,
used gambling profits … to fund road construction, public buildings and other infra-
structure projects that Kengtung—a town under Burmese control just a few hours
away—could only dream of. Mong La’s rapid modernization led former prime minister
Gen Khin Nyunt to pronounce the city as developed as Rangoon during a visit in 2001.
In truth, the city was—and still is—developmentally superior to the capital.17 Reports
suggest Mong La—the capital of an area that is home to less than 80,000 people—
has generated up to $5 billion in total gambling revenues since casinos were first auth-
orized.… That figure represents an average of nearly $10,400 per capita annually from
gambling profits generated in Mong La alone, up to the end of 2004, when business at
the casinos ground to a halt. By contrast, the average Burmese citizen living in areas
controlled by the Burmese regime was estimated to have made just $1,800 in 2005
(Parker 2006).
In 2003, concerned with gambling by government officials, China closed
Mong La’s border to non-local Chinese citizens. Casinos moved to other areas
of Special Region 4 (ibid.) and to Kachin State Special Region 3, where a
similar crackdown occurred in 2009 after the Chinese media reported incidents
of kidnapping and torture of gamblers unable to pay their debts. The Yunnan
government responded by cutting off water, telecommunications (disrupting
Internet access and thereby the casinos’ accounting), power, and roads (ICG
2009: 16). Moreover, according to the International Crisis Group, “Chinese
troops … closed border crossings to casino towns and raided casinos across
the border, arresting and fining all Chinese, including casino operators and
gamblers” (ibid.: n. 171). Casinos again reopened, now farther from the
border, but the National Democratic Alliance Army has also been trying to
attract Chinese investment in coal mining and logging.
In 2009, the Burmese army unexpectedly occupied Special Region 1,
replaced Peng Jiasheng with his deputy, and transformed the Myanmar
National Democratic Alliance Army into a border guard force (ICG 2010:
19). The invasion caused thirty-seven thousand refugees to flee across the
border into China, the first such event reported in the Chinese media since
the late-1970s flight of ethnic Chinese from Vietnam (ICG 2009: 13). The
Burmese government has also demanded that the other “ceasefire armies”
join its border guard force, and since the armies have rejected this there are
fears that other special regions might be invaded, or even that civil war
might return. China reportedly deployed extra troops on the Burmese border
in May 2010 (Wade 2010), while the UWSA was said to be recruiting
veteran soldiers from China (Kachin News Group 2009). These tensions
17 An almost identical observation is made about Lashio, in Special Zone 2, by Thant Myint-U
(quoted in Deb 2011).
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were a further blow to the casino business (Shan Herald 2009), and investors
intensified their search for ways to get out with their capital. In 2011, a resigned
atmosphere permeated Special Region 4. With the Chinese government and
state-owned corporations concluding more investment agreements with the
Burmese junta that sidelined the interests of border trade, special zone officials
had little doubt that they would soon lose their autonomy; their only hope was
to negotiate relatively favorable terms.
The administration of Special Zone 4 and its sympathizers in China portray
Sai Lin and his former BPA cadre as equivalents to their Chinese communist
patrons, as leaders who have, despite international isolation and the threat of
war, skillfully steered the zone away from the dire poverty and drug trading of
twenty years ago to the relative modernity of today. Their reports emphasize
infrastructural improvements, school construction, and rising incomes.18 But
because of the shifting interests of China’s central leadership, their gambit of
transforming themselves from leaders of the international proletarian revolution
FIGURE 3 Mong La, Shan State Special Region 4, June 2011. Author’s photo.
18 An example is the bilingual (Burmese-Chinese) booklet produced for the twentieth anniver-
sary of the special region in 2009: Chan Bang Dong Bu Di Si Tequ Jianqu Ershi Zhou Nian (Twen-
tieth anniversary of Special Region 4, Eastern Shan State). n.p.
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into leaders of an apolitical but quasi-capitalist modernization is almost certain to
fail. The best they can hope for is to secure roles as local brokers between
Chinese and Burmese officials and capital. Rank-and-file “educated youth”
BPA fighters, most of them poor and embittered by their lack of recognition
from the Chinese government, have turned to using semi-underground publi-
cations to demand their place in history and, often, democratization.
In contrast, the developers of Golden Boten and the Golden Triangle
Special Economic Zone are trying to establish themselves as regional moderni-
zers at an opportune moment. In 2008, a master plan for the economic devel-
opment of Northern Laos, prepared by Chinese specialists on behalf of the
Yunnan Province Reform and Development Commission, and presented to
the Lao government, proposed setting up new free trade zones along the coun-
try’s borders and developing tourism concessions, which contractors would
operate and control (Northern Laos 2008). This proposal seems to be reflected
in Laos’ 2009 Law on Investment Promotion, which enables the establishment
of Special Economic Zones, defined as “a development zone for urbanization”
that may consist of industrial, tourist, free trade, residential, and other kinds of
zones (Article 33). This vision is further elaborated in Decree number 443/PM,
issued in October 2010, which sets out the criteria for transforming a special
zone into a city (Article 33): it must have a population of at least eighty thou-
sand and an infrastructure that includes schools, hospitals, and preferably an
international airport.
Such fantastic visions are probably inspired by developers’ promotional
texts, and also encourage further promises from them. The brochure of GBC
asks potential investors to “believe that thousands of people will … live and
develop here with various occupations and identities, to form a huge commu-
nity, and a modern society.” On the back cover of the inaugural January 2008
issue of Luang Namtha Provincial Tourism Magazine, Boten is already
described as the “most internationally modernized city in [L]ao,” while a
FIGURE 4 Street signs in Special Region 4 and the Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone, June
2011. Author’s photo.
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journalist for a Bangkok-based Chinese-language business magazine describes
the Golden Triangle Special Economic Zone as “a miracle,”which he attributes
to the “diligence, perseverance, idealism, and heroism” of Chinese entrepre-
neurs venturing into Southeast Asia (Hanzi 2010: 11). A report on Phoenix
TV, a popular Hong Kong-based satellite channel, compared Boten to Shenz-
hen, China’s first, legendary special zone, which grew from a fishing village
to become one of southern China’s largest cities (Phoenix 2010). While these
sources are certainly biased, Boten’s rows of condo-like buildings make it, in
a sense, the most modern-looking place in Laos outside the capital, Vientiane:
the sight replicates new urban districts that Chinese companies have in recent
years rapidly constructed on the dilapidated outskirts of Kampala and Luanda.
What is different about Boten’s urbanization is that it is turning spatial hierar-
chies on their head: the remote borderlands of the nation are, by virtue of their
closeness to China, beginning to look more metropolitan than its very center.
Thant Myint-U, makes the same point about Lashio in northeastern Burma:
“It’s a stunning reversal in Burma’s geography. What had been remote is
now closer to the new center. What were muddy mountain hamlets are now
more modern than Rangoon” (quoted in Deb 2011).
The discourse of modernization is ubiquitous in the zones. The Golden
Triangle Special Economic Zone promises to “lead local people to shake off
the poverty and backwardness” of the “wilderness of old days” and move
into a “modern economic development zone,” a “green ecocity with a popu-
lation of no less than 200 thousand” in ten to fifteen years.19 In this discourse,
familiar from China, modernization is a journey along which humans and
nature are transformed together with the investing company, so that “inhospi-
table and ungovernable places [become] pacified, morally superior, and gov-
ernable consumer paradises” (Tomba 2009: 610). At a ceremony during
which KingsRomans donated fifty motorized rickshaws (tuk-tuks) to Lao resi-
dents in the presence of Premier Thongsing, Zhao Wei urged the residents to
“change their traditional way of doing business” (Laosez.com 2011). Pro-
motional brochures combine the heroic language of conquering nature,
which harkens back to Maoist times, with the lingo of modern management
and the vision of urbanization, with the latest buzzwords of sustainability
and environmentalism themselves understood as features of modernity.
Although the pursuit of capital is never far from the surface, promotional
texts for both zones invariably include a promise of cosmopolitanism and
world-betterment that transcends economic globalization.
It is easy to dismiss these promises as the sales pitch of Mong La “drug
lords wishing to launder their money” (Tan 2010: 6), for whom the Lao govern-
ment’s enthusiasm for special zones came as a godsend. Yet Prime Minister’s
19 At: http://www.kingsromans.com and http://www.laosez.com/html/tqgk/ (accessed 16 Feb.
2011).
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Thongsing’s desire to “leverage the model function of the special zone” (Huang
2011) is shared, at least in part, by UNIDO—the UN’s industrial development
organization—and the Asian Development Bank, which run a joint project to
“promote the development of special economic zones in Laos.”20 KingsRo-
mans’ insistence that “today’s Golden Triangle … needs to shake off, on the
one hand, the old days’ shadow of drugs and, on the other hand, poverty and
ignorance,”21 and that it is engaged in building an opium “substitution
economy” (Hanzi 2010: 12), is a tactic to gain legitimacy with varied audi-
ences: the Lao government, which prioritizes the development of special
zones as areas for promoting economic growth, international institutions, and
also the Yunnan provincial government, which has described its opium-
substitution subsidies in Mong La and Kokang as a successful development
intervention (Shi Anda 1998; Zhang Ansheng and Zhang Xiaoming 2002;
Zhao 2011). Zhao Wei, the chairman of Golden Triangle’s economic commit-
tee, thinks what he is doing is “not just investment but accumulating merit
( jide): by cutting off the Golden Triangle’s source of drugs, I can save many
people” (Hanzi 2010: 12). Zhao claims to have spent nearly $10 million to
help projects in the region, including drug eradication initiatives in Burma
and schools in Burma and Thailand (ibid.: 16).
These explicit, elaborate claims to be modeling modernity are grounded in
two powerful and conflicting discourses. One, which is both visual and textual,
replicates the paraphernalia of the Chinese state, from communiqués to cer-
emonies, and banners to uniforms. These appear to have a dual function:
First, they borrow power from the authority of the strong neighboring state
as if by synesthesia, by suggesting a connection through the senses without
explicitly stating that there is one. But they also borrow efficacy as a develop-
mental regime by imitating the practices of a state associated with developmen-
tal powers. When Zhao Wei makes speeches about “responsibility to history,”
“rapid, healthy development,” or “promoting Sino-Lao friendship” (ibid.: 13–
15), he is not just lionizing himself: he is borrowing the language of state enter-
prises investing in, say, Lao hydropower. This discourse affirms paternalism,
order, discipline, and economic growth, and associates these with the
People’s Republic of China as a model. Although many Asian states have
employed special zones as a development model, in Laos (as in Africa or
Papua New Guinea), where they have arrived only in the last few years, they
have been specifically associated with China. According to a manager at
Golden Triangle, Lao officials returning from training in China, particularly
younger ones, have been keen to apply the “Shenzhen model” at home. It is
easy to imagine that the familiar trappings of the state are reassuring to these
20 Remarks by Sonam Yangchen Rana, UN Resident Coordinator, Lao Plaza Hotel, Vientiane,
16 July 2009; and Chong Chi Nai, ADB Country Director, ibid., 15 Oct. 2010.
21 Introduction to KingsRomans investors’ brochure.
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officials, who are also engaged in an institutional rivalry with military units
that, by entering into joint ventures with Chinese rubber planters, are accumu-
lating wealth, and thus gaining influence within the state.
Yet there is a second discourse upon which claims of modernizing power
are based, one of economic and social freedom from discipline imposed by the
state. The former vice-chairman of Golden Boten’s administrative committee
emphasized this when I interviewed him: “This is the SEZ [Special Economic
Zone] in the world in which investors have the most rights to invest.” Such
competitive claims to greater freedom are, of course, central to the attractive-
ness of special zones, not only for major investors but also to individual
fortune-seekers, from gamblers to oilcake vendors. The prominence of gam-
bling, drugs, and sex is arguably not just a product of short-term profit
seeking, but also a functional element of this discourse of freedom. Indeed,
if the special zones feel both more regulated and more freewheeling than the
national territory within which they are enclaved, it is perhaps partly by design.
This design suits the interests of not only investors and fortune-seekers,
but also, in some ways, those of the Lao state. This is so in the general
sense, which Aihwa Ong and others have noted, that all types of special
zones allow states to maintain control flexibly and minimize resource invest-
ment. But it is also so in a more specific sense in remote borderlands where
state penetration has been very limited. Danielle Tan argues that in northern
Laos, “The Chinese presence,”
far from eroding the state… permits it to adapt to the constraints of globalization.… The
new Chinese networks … will serve as essential mediators between the state and the
global economy; … they will participate in the restructuring of power, providing it
the means to adapt to neoliberal globalization, offering it new possibilities of regulating
and controlling its territory and population.… Chinese migration, along with the process
of regional integration … grant the Lao state the necessary financial, technological, and
human means, which it never had, to access the resources of these territories and to
undertake what James C. Scott has called the last enclosure … to make the northern
highlands profitable (n.d.).
Chinese migrants, Tan effectively argues, have regained the function of a
“middleman minority” (Bonacich 1973; see also Nyíri 2011) which they had
under the colonial authorities (and highland Haw and other Chinese-speaking
groups are once again becoming intermediaries for them). These migrants
provide farmers with seedlings (mostly of rubber palm, but also of other
cash crops), fertilizer, and access to markets, and they collect produce and
take care of its passage through the Lao-Chinese border, including by negotiat-
ing payments with customs officials. “By producing rent and new opportunities
of redistribution among influential personalities, they contribute to the viability
of the state. Thus, Chinese investment and migration help render the highlands
‘legible,’ governable, and profitable for the lowland state while impeding the
emergence of a regional bourgeoisie that might threaten the power of the
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current rulers” (Tan 2010: 16), just as it did for colonial rulers and the aristoc-
racy allied with them. According to Tan, if the position of Chinese migrants in
northern Laos approaches that of tax farmers, as Tan asserts, then the special
zones constitute full-blown tax farms.
E X P E R I M E N T S W I T H S O V E R E I G N T Y A ND V I S I O N S O F P R O G R E S S
“Thinking beyond the nation” has been most productive when it has looked not
for the erosion of state sovereignty but for spaces in which the sovereign func-
tions of the state are farmed out to private companies or militaries, whether
domestic or foreign, or international structures. The experience of northern
Laos suggests that Chinese concessions do not represent a return to colonialism
with a new colonizer: the ostentatious presence of Chinese state symbols is not
state strategy but rather a synesthetic trick. Slogans and uniforms aside, in com-
parison to the enclaves of the BPA’s armed revolutionary resistance from which
the present special zones evolved, the discourse of modernization through
which their rulers now justify their existence is technical rather than political.
And yet, to view these special zones as the “business as usual” of devel-
opmentalism’s “anti-politics machine” (Ferguson 1990), or of neoliberal globa-
lization, which ultimately smooth over disharmony between state and capital
for the sake of profit (Ong 2006), is to miss an important dimension of the
zones. For one thing, not only do new types of social fields involving
Chinese and non-Chinese emerge in the zones, generating new forms of poli-
tics, but the zones also fundamentally upset the performative relationship
between state and nation. For another, Chinese-managed concessions of
various kinds are proliferating around the world, for mining, agriculture, man-
ufacturing, free trade zones, railways, and power-generation (Nyíri 2009; Brau-
tigam and Tang Xiaoyang 2011). While these will probably vary considerably
regarding their forms of governance and sovereignty, and patterns of sociality
between Chinese and non-Chinese residents, they are also likely to share and
reproduce certain symbols, discourses, and forms of discipline associated
with modernization of a sort familiar from China. When champions of what
Danielle Tan termed “criminal development” deploy the same slogans and
rituals as managers of state-owned hydropower enterprises (Lyttleton and
Nyíri 2011), they do so to garner legitimacy with both the Chinese and the
local state, as well as with investors. But their partaking in a shared discourse
of progress, which beyond immediate promises of enrichment gives them a
cargo-cult-like appeal among local officials, also justifies and structures
actions and aspirations in the zones. This discourse enfolds casinos and
dams along the Mekong into a vision of progress that culminates in astonishing
images, such as the high-speed railway system that China proposed in 2010,
which, it was said, would carry passengers from London to Peking in two days.
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C O N C L U S I O N : D E V E L O PM E N TA L I S M AND S O V E R E I G N T Y
During the Cold War, both ideological sides were committed to the idea of the
continual improvability of the human condition, but this view has since fallen
out of fashion in the West. It has declined due to the spread of negative assess-
ments of Western development aid; to criticisms of economic growth as the sole
indicator of improved well-being and free-market capitalism as the only way to
achieve it; and to environmental concerns; and arguably because most Wester-
ners did not feel that their own condition improved over this period. In China,
by contrast, both official and popular faith in progress is one of the most endur-
ing legacies of the twentieth century. The nature of progress was redefined
along the way, as illustrated in miniature by the way in which, in the special
zones of the borderlands, visions of class liberation evolved into those of eco-
tourism. While this has damaged the credibility of those who have pronounced
these ideas from positions of power, it has not undermined the notion of pro-
gress itself.
The meshing of private and state fantasies of development explains why
the pretensions of special zone developers cannot be dismissed out of hand.
A “vice economy” now drives these zones, investors obviously seek to make
a quick buck, and the Chinese state has cracked down. But we should not
assume from these facts that zone managers and the officials they talk to in
Laos and China do not view the zones as at least potential enclaves of progress.
(What traction this view has with the Lao more broadly is a different and sig-
nificant question.) As things now stand, the Golden Triangle Special Economic
Zone, located farther than Boten from the punitive reach of Chinese authorities,
and with more resources available to it, may well continue to grow. Golden
Boten’s new investor intends to develop it into a logistical hub. Practices of
sovereignty will remain contested, but the enclaves’ best insurance against
violent reversals of the sort that occurred in Burma is to deliver on their
promise of modernization and integrate their economies with those of the
“Greater Mekong Subregion.”
It is the promise of progress that makes such experiments with sovereignty
possible. As was true a hundred years ago, this not only expresses the dominant
tenets of the global economy at a given historical moment; it also represents an
upheaval in ways of thinking about the future. As before, the situation is rife
with threats of violence and destroyed livelihoods, but also with the creativity
that makes “new imaginations of community possible” (van der Veer 1996: 7).
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Abstract: The highlands of mainland Southeast Asia have famously been the
locus of “Zomia,” polities resistant to control by lowland nation-states, but this
relative resilience has been due to their marginality. However, as even remote bor-
derlands connect to the market economies of what has been labeled the “Greater
Mekong Subregion,” these semi-independent polities are trying to transform
themselves from isolated drug enclaves into regional paragons of economic mod-
ernity labeled “Special Economic Zones.” The main actors in this transformation
are ethnic Chinese migrant capitalists who embrace the economic rhetoric of
mainland China’s “growth model” to create respectability and to evoke images
of a cosmopolitan future as they build casinos in the rainforest. The zones’
claim to be the vanguard of modernity rests on two mutually contradictory sets
of symbols: a mimicry of Chinese state paraphernalia designed to conjure up
the efficacy of a strong developmental state, and the discourse of freedom from
state control. This article examines the transformation of zones of political and
criminal resistance into zones of economic development from a historical per-
spective of changing practices of sovereignty and shifting understandings of
development.
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